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Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) face one common challenge when integrating with
the existing manned aircraft population in the National Airspace System (NAS). To unlock the
full efficiency of UAS, the UAS integrator must comply with an onboard pilot’s requirement to
see-and-avoid other aircraft while operating. Commercially available Detect-and-Avoid (DAA)
sensor technologies have been developed to attempt to comply with this requirement. UAS
integrators must use these sensors to meet or exceed the performance of a human pilot. This
thesis covers research done to integrate an array of commercially made DAA sensors with a
large Group 3 UAS both in hardware and software that was later flight tested and evaluated for
usability. A fast-time simulation is presented using the principles of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration’s (NASA) Detect-and-AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems
(DAIDALUS). Last, open-source tools are presented to assist future integrators in validating
their DAA solutions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The past several decades have seen an explosion in technological growth and in particular
automation. The market incentive to reduce manpower costs while improving efficiency has
increased the concentration on the development of systems that may replace a human operator.
Industrial plants turned to robotic arms for car manufacturing, Computer Numeric Control
(CNC) and 3d printing. These machines have given creative access to the average consumer. In a
similar sense, aviation has turned to unmanning aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and ease
of use inherent in small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) has led to a forecasted market
growth of 30 billion dollars annually by 2035 (Wargo, Church and Glaneueski). This expansion
and accessibility of the technology forced regulators to limit the use of sUAS in the National
Airspace System (NAS). Part 107 is a rule in development to restrict the use of sUAS to certain
airspace, altitudes, and operations. Remote pilots operating under this rule are responsible for the
safety risks associated with flying an unmanned aircraft under 55 pounds, as misuse could lead to
property damage or even fatal accidents. The primary responsibility of the UAS operator is to
See-and-Avoid (SAA) intruder aircraft within the ownship’s airspace as stated in Call For
Release (CFR) Part 91.113 which will be explained within this thesis. Unlike sUAS regulations,
large UAS do not currently have a regulatory path forward for complying with the CFR Part
91.113 requirement. These longer endurance, higher altitude-capable aircraft are more efficient
for federal and commercial operators looking to cover long lines of infrastructure or loiter over
1

post-disaster areas. For large UAS operations to expand to Beyond-Visual-Line-of-Sight
(BVLOS) operations like package delivery and linear inspection, Detect-and-Avoid (DAA)
standards must be established and similarly met by operators. This responsibility to See-andAvoid while operating large UAS within the same airspace as manned aviation concerns the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), leading to multiple funds for research related to this
issue. The budget for the FAA to conduct research and development related to airspace safety
including UAS integration into the NAS was 512 million dollars as of fiscal year 2020 (Sarget,
Harris and Cowan). The FAA allocated money to different research facilities to progress the
availability of data to support decisive regulatory activities pertaining mainly to sUAS, leaving
larger UAS as a future goal post. This leaves integrating a larger UAS into the NAS to be a
considerable challenge when the regulatory documentation has yet to be codified.
The FAA continues to work with both industry and researchers to make informed, datadriven, and safe rules for UAS operators and air traffic managers before allowing the integration
of UAS into the NAS. Many standards and safe practices must be established before operators
may begin to fly their UAS BVLOS. The current practices for establishing a safety case for
receiving an authorization to operate large UAS BVLOS are not concrete and mostly diverse. In
this thesis research, a large UAS integrated with three flat panel radars is simulated within
scripted encounters produced by Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory’s
(MIT LL’s) open-source Bayesian network models for generating encounter trajectories. The
simulation utilizes the kinematics approach similar to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administrations’s (NASA) Detect-and-AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems
(DAIDALUS) and simplistic models for radar performance. The work done to integrate the radar
array with a large UAS, and the necessary software development, will be overviewed. Open2

source tools and a suggested simulation framework for future UAS integrators to validate their
DAA solutions will also be presented.
1.1

Purpose
This thesis research brings many of the developing aspects of regulation, simulation, and

validation together to inform the public and interested parties about the research being done on
UAS with regards to DAA capabilities. There are many commercially available DAA systems,
autopilots, unmanned aircraft, Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs), and BVLOS products.
However, there still is much research to be done before the FAA may move forward with fully
integrating UAS into the NAS. The following thesis will serve as a benchmark in the future
development of this sector of aviation research, recording the to-date progress. Tools for industry
and safety cases for regulators are still being developed concurrently alongside this thesis work.
That being stated, this thesis will cover the current development both regulatory and in research,
survey the present availability of DAA systems and their strengths and weaknesses, evaluate a
conceptual framework of a DAA system integrated with a large UAS in simulation, expand on
some of the research that was done to integrate an airborne radar array with a large UAS as part
of this thesis, provide references to open-source tools for future UAS integrators, suggest a
simulation framework for system validation, and finally speculate on the future of UAS
integration into the NAS encompassing multiple future decision-making steps and avenues of
possible research. Although the result of this thesis research is not the finalized authorization of a
BVLOS-ready Group 3 UAS, it hopes to be a major inspiration for future applicators of DAA
technology for specifically large UAS and be an informative guide for new researchers seeking
to join an area of aviation research with enormous future economic potential.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
2.1

Unmanned Aircraft System Grouping
Unmanned Aircraft are divided into five categories This research focuses on Group 3

UAS which is defined as aircraft less than 1,320 pounds but greater than 55 pounds that fly lower
than 18,000 feet mean sea level at airspeeds less than 250 knots. The United States Department
of Defense is responsible for this classification of the different tiers of UAS.
Table 2.1
UAS
Group

UAS classification by size and speed by the United States Department of Defense.
Maximum
weight
(lb)

Nominal
operating
altitude (ft)

Group 1 0–20

< 1,200 AGL

Group 2

< 3,500 AGL

21–55

Speed (kn)

100

RQ-11 Raven, WASP, Puma,

ScanEagle, Flexrotor, SIC5
< 250

Group 3

Representative UAS

V-BAT, RQ-7B Shadow, RQ-21
Blackjack, Navmar RQ-23 Tigershark,
Arcturus-UAV Jump 20

< 1,320
< FL 180

Group 4
Any airspeed

MQ-8B Fire Scout, MQ-1A/B
Predator, MQ-1C Gray Eagle

> 1,320
Group 5

MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ4C Triton

> FL 180
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2.2

Unmanned Aircraft System Use Cases
The unmanned sector of aviation comprises recreational pilots, part 107 commercial

pilots, and those flying for missions for the national agencies. Although UAS has its roots in
military applications, the availability of UAS as well as the increase in technological capabilities
of sensors has broadened to potential pool of use cases. Inspection of linear infrastructure like
power lines and railways, as well as agricultural mapping and crop inspection are two of the
many possible uses of UAS. Multispectral and hyperspectral cameras have been fitted and downsized to meet the UAS platform’s low cost, size, weight, and power (C-SWaP) requirements,
allowing for operators to develop new business models around these use cases.
2.3

Part 107 and CFR 91.113
After a surge of sUAS entering the NAS from the early 2000s to recent, the FAA came

out with a rule for certifying remote pilots and commercial operators. This rule, Part 107, applies
to operators with a “small drone that is less than 55 pounds” (FAA) flying for work or business.
Included in Part 107 is limitations for flying over people, in certain airspaces and nighttime
operation. In order to fly BVLOS, a Part 107 waiver must be authorized by the FAA. To obtain
this waiver, an operator may go through the Part 107 Waiver application process which
encompasses explaining to the FAA how a waived part of the Part 107 rules will not seriously
affect the safety-focused intent of the limitations on sUAS operations. Once a waiver is
approved, a sUAS operator may fly without whichever limitation or part of the rule that was
waived. This process has been in the works for several years, and a few Part 107 authorizations
for BVLOS have been made by the FAA for certain operators. However, there is currently no
process by which a large UAS may receive authorization to fly BVLOS. Currently, large UAS
operators may operate under Part 91, which regulates general operating and flight rules used
5

most consistently in general aviation. To enable BVLOS operations for these larger craft would
mean the authorization of an alternate means of meeting CFR Part 91.113(b) which states:
General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be
maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft.
When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give
way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear.
A pilot operating under Part 91 is responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft while
maintaining a sufficient well clear self-separation from intruders within the pilot’s airspace.
Since unmanned aircraft have no pilot onboard, the remote pilot is responsible for fulfilling this
role. Although, once a UAS is out of the line-of-sight or at such a distance that the remote pilot
can no longer effectively mitigate self-separation violations, then an onboard system or system of
systems must step in. Commonly, DAA sensors try to fill this safety gap with complex solutions
to replacing equivalently what can be referred to as the pilot in the cockpit. To receive BVLOS
authorization for a large Group 3 UAS, the safety case of these sensors must be proven.
2.4

Detect-and-Avoid
An aspect of UAS that is of great interest to the unmanned sector of aviation is DAA and

how it may enable the capabilities of operators to fly BVLOS. The premise of DAA is to replace
the requirement of the pilot to See-and-Avoid other aircraft and make conscious maneuvers to
avoid the intruder aircraft while flying. DAA systems range from radar to lidar and are intended
to integrate with a UAS’ autopilot for the purpose of meeting or exceeding that requirement.
Some studies have modelled the pilot visual acquisition model which intends to describe the
capability of any pilot to see an aircraft as well as predict their performance at various distances
6

and angles. These models have influenced the regulators’ decisions resulting in the establishment
of risk and mitigation metrics.
The DAA system, integrated with the ownship aircraft, is responsible for maintaining a
Well Clear Volume (WCV) around the aircraft. The current revision of the volume extends
horizontally 2,000 ft and vertically 250 ft in both directions (Weinart, Campbell and Vela). The
resulting “hockey puck” shape centered around the ownship intends to be a measure of adequate
self-separation. Similarly, a Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) cylinder is defined as 500 ft
horizontally and 100 ft vertically. For comparison between performance of pilots and DAA
systems, a normalized statistic needs to be identified and accepted. A Risk Ratio (RR) serves to
quantify safety of interaction between aircraft during the length of an encounter. The RR itself
can be calculated as the number of times the WCV or NMAC is violated during several
encounters divided by the total number of encounters within a set.
# 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟
# 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑

(3.1)

# 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑁𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑀𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑖𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
# 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑

(3.2)

𝑅𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑊𝐶 =

𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑀𝐴𝐶 =

Basically, a RR can be a ratio of safety mitigation given the addition of onboard sensing
systems or procedural mitigations taken by the operator. RRs and their relevance to both flight
testing and encounter simulation are explained later within this document.

7

2.5

Detect-and-Avoid Technologies
Passive and active sensors have the capability of being multi-use, specifically in aiding

the UAS in detecting an intruder in the airspace and giving the autopilot necessary information to
calculate an avoidance maneuver that will deconflict the encounter. Although most sensors
perform well at close ranges, the WCV with a horizontal range of 2,000 feet is a major obstacle
for DAA sensor manufacturers. The necessity of the ownship to stay 2,000 feet from intruding
aircraft is due to the short amount of time it takes a manned general aviation aircraft to travel
2,000 feet and fly into the near mid-air collision (NMAC) volume, causing a potential accident.
Sensors to be used for DAA must also meet the low C-SWaP requirements of the potentially
used platform. Therefore, the DAA manufacturers have sought out low power solutions such as
EO/IR optics. Radars are generally regarded as power-hungry devices, but companies like
Echodyne and Fortem Technologies have found a way to decrease the sensor size and
requirements in such a way to be a payload even for sUAS. Lidar provides highly accurate short
range point cloud data but struggles with meeting the 2,000 feet range. Last, an acoustic system
manufactured by SARA, Inc. has the potential of fulfilling DAA requirements for BVLOS. The
below Figure 2.1 from a FAA report highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each sensor type
(S.B. Hottman). The following section highlights some of these currently available DAA
technologies.
Detects Noncoop Discerns Detects Day and Detects Multiple
Targets
Range
in IMC
Night
Targets
Search
EO
Yes
No
No
No
??
Human Visual
Yes
No
No
No
No
IR Search and Track
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Passive IR
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Radar
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Cooperative Surveillance
TCAS/ACAS
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
ADS-B
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Technology

Figure 2.1

Full
Time

Multiple Detection
Sectors Range, NM

Constant
Azimuth Issue

Co-alt Supports Asym Sym
Issue Due Regard Cover Covert

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

4?
2
22+
22+
22+

Yes
Yes
No
No
No

No
No
Yes
Yes
No

No
Yes
??
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

22+
22+

No
No

No
No

No
No

Yes
Yes

No
No

DAA Sensors Compared by Multiple Characteristics (S.B. Hottman).
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2.5.2

Optical Systems
Although optical sensors have been around in many forms for decades, the premise of

using cameras as the basis of collision avoidance is relatively new. Some automated ground
vehicles use camera systems to identify obstacles and make decisions about how to avoid them.
However, this obstacle avoidance concept is relatively new to the unmanned aviation sector, and
at the forefront of DAA for BVLOS operations is the company Iris Automation. This
manufacturer has targeted sUAS and advertises a BVLOS product. This product includes
multiple long-range cameras, approximately 4,000 ft in detection range, and a module capable of
determining avoidance maneuvers and conversing them with the autopilot. The system provides
an interface and display for clearly communicating to the operator the relative bearing and range
of an intruder once the target is identified. The single-camera system can be seen in Figure 2.2 as
well as the 360-degree solution utilizing five cameras with 80-degree azimuth and 50-degree
elevation field-of-view (FOV). The manufacturer integrated artificial intelligence for classifying
the intruding aircraft which may help with decision-making in the short time between detection
and closest point of approach. Overall, the Casia optical solution for DAA appears to be a viable
choice for operators seeking a BVLOS waiver or authorization for their Part 107 flights. The
system does face challenges when trying to meet customer needs for all-weather operations as
rain and haze are common challenges for optical systems.

9

Figure 2.2

2.5.3

Iris Long Range Camera (left) and 360-degree Multi-Camera Solution (right).
Images taken from (Iris Automation Inc.)

Radar Systems
Ground-based radar is a proven and historically pivotal technology used for detecting and

tracking airborne targets. Similarly, airborne radar dates to the mid-20th century. Therefore, it is
no surprise that the technology has been downsized, optimized for low power, and available for
integration with UAS. On the forefront of radar based DAA solutions are Echodyne and Fortem
Technologies. Echodyne’s metamaterial electronically scanning array (MESA) radar is unique to
their system although Fortem’s products use a similarly computer steered antenna array. There
are no publicly released comparisons of the two systems, so only their core characteristics are
discussed in this paper. Echodyne’s airborne flat panel EchoFlight is capable of 120-degrees of
horizontal coverage and 80-degrees elevation. Fortem Technology offers a family of radar
solutions. One is the larger R30 while the other is the more compact R20 radar. The horizontal
performance is identical to the previous flat panel radar, but the elevation range is exactly half.
Radar solutions have advantages in their all-weather operation capabilities as the RF energy can
travel the air and return to the receiver with little to no obstruction caused by light rain and haze.
Therefore, as mentioned in the FAA report on DAA systems, radar will be a viable component
for customers looking for uninterrupted, all-weather, day and night BVLOS operation.
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Figure 2.3

2.5.4

EchoFlight Airborne Radar (left) and Fortem TrueView R20 (right).

Acoustic Systems
Passive sensors range in their concepts, such as optical and passive radar. There also

exists a passive acoustic sensor, that can drown out the ownship noise and listen for nearby air
traffic while airborne. SARA, Inc. has developed the Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative
Collision Avoidance System (PANCAS) that can detect the low frequencies emissions from
general aviation aircraft and determine a bearing and distance to establish a track. The system
was tested in the FAA Pathfinder report and found to be capable of tracking all types of aircraft
as far out as 5 nautical miles (Ferguson). This sensor seems to be very promising in the future of
enabling BVLOS for UAS as its low power and physical signature are attractive to potential
customers. In the below Figure 2.4, the PANCAS system is installed on a small UAS. The
microphone array can be seen attached to the top of each motor at the end of the arms of the
aircraft frame. Like the optical DAA solutions, the PANCAS acoustic sensor may not perform
viably during inclement weather but excels in quiet environments.
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Figure 2.4

2.5.5

SARA Inc.’s PANCAS Airborne DAA System Installed on a sUAS

Lidar
Lidar is an active sensor, sending pulses of light outward and collecting information on

the reflection of the sensor’s environment to determine range. The output data from this sensor is
commonly referred to a point cloud. The point cloud is a multidimensional matrix that represents
the returns of the sensor, generally in a three-dimensional form. Other sensors can similarly
create point clouds, but because of lidar’s 360-degree field-of-view and large elevation
capabilities, the amount of data returned is significantly higher. Therefore, it is common to see
lidar output be organized into such a form. Inherent to the shear amount of data is the necessity
for onboard processing to be substantial. Not all UAS can support this data transfer rate so
usually an additional processing system is needed. Unfortunately, the high accuracy and airspace
awareness capabilities of lidar are bogged down by the lack of range. For DAA systems, range is
of highest importance. Lidar sensors could potentially complement close ranges for applications
like urban commerce, but currently are incapable of fulfilling the range requirements of DAA.
Therefore, lidar systems will not be represented in this research, but if future lidar systems can
span past the 2,000 ft WCV horizontal range, then application of these active sensors may be
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revisited. For now, lidar serves as a highly accurate and viable sensor solution for short-range
obstacle avoidance.
2.5.6

Summary of Sensors
The aforementioned sensors inherently have advantages and disadvantages. Radar can

see through most inclement weather with great accuracy, optical sensors can use artificial
intelligence to characterize the intruder and make assumptions about future behavior, and passive
sensors like acoustic have low physical footprints and power consumption. Small UAS do not
generally have the power budget to support a multi-sensor suite for DAA, especially when their
primary payload may be a high-powered multispectral payload. On the other hand, most large
UAS have generators and the capability to support multiple payloads. The trade space for DAA
solutions for BVLOS operations also includes flight times, structural strength, and software
compatibility. In this thesis research, a large fixed-wing UAS will be considered, thus
eliminating any potential power consumption obstacles in integration. The large UAS will also
be assumed to be physically capable of supporting multiple low C-SWaP DAA payloads and
software compatibility will be addressed with an additional onboard mission computer that can
communicate synchronously with the DAA systems with adequate data transfer speed. The DAA
solution will be a heterogenous culmination of some of the previously mentioned sensors. This
multi-sensor suite will benefit from the advantages of each system, and in some instances, the
FOV of each sensor may overlap thus providing beneficial double coverage of that area. Overall,
this multi-sensor suite will theoretically provide adequate coverage beyond the WCV and will
provide the large UAS with ample time to determine the safest maneuver to deconflict the
potential loss of well clear.
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CHAPTER III
DETECT-AND-AVOID SIMULATION
3.1

Simulation Background
Monte Carlo or ‘fast-time’ simulation provides a statistical representation of both worst-

and best-case scenarios for a given application. The Monte Carlo method uses an iterative
approach for statistical analysis, spanning thousands and millions of repeated simulations. A
DAA integrator can present a strong safety case by developing a framework for simulating the
encounter between a UAS and a manned aircraft, and then repeatedly analyzing the performance
of each DAA sensor, the aircraft, and the environment to prove the efficacy of the DAA solution.
An example of such a simulation framework can be seen in Figure 3.1, which was provided to
industry and regulators by MIT LL’s team.

Figure 3.1

Example Monte Carlo Framework Provided by MIT LL. Figure credit to
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
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MIT LL’s framework consists of taking raw track data from airspace across the
Continental United States (CONUS) and drawing statistical inferences about the behavior of
manned aircraft within each altitude layer, airspace class, and geographical location (Andrew
Weinart). The result of the track processing is the encounter models that have been made mostly
open source to the UAS community. The intent is to use the encounter models as well as the
dynamic model of the aircraft and its respective sensor models within a fast-time simulation.
These fast-time simulations take the pairs of ownship and intruder trajectories, referred to as
encounters with a larger set of pairs deemed an encounter set, and iteratively analyze the ability
of the ownship to maintain well clear of the intruding aircraft. As previously mentioned, the RR
is one of the results of these fast-time simulations. MIT LL also provides an open-source
simulation environment specific to DAA applications called DAA Evaluation of Guidance,
Alerting, and Surveillance (DEGAS). This simulator is also a Monte-Carlo simulation but also
includes pilot models and an interface with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s
(NASA) open source Detect-and-AvoID Alerting Logic for Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(DAIDALUS).
3.1.2

Terminal Airspace Encounter Data Set
MIT LL developed a statistical representation of manned aircraft trajectories in terminal,

near airports, airspace. The resulting data set has been made available to those in the UAS world
on their GitHub page. The two million sampled trajectories encompass one million total
encounters between unmanned aircraft and manned aircraft in near-airport terminal airspace. The
model focuses on UAS on a straight-in approach to a Class D airport. The data set includes
encounters during takeoff and landing with a general aviation manned aircraft. Generally, the
MIT LL Bayesian networks create individual trajectories and then pair them down the pipeline
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for generating encounters. This data set, however, explicitly models two aircraft for each
encounter. After downloading and transferring the data set to a MATLAB environment, the
following figures were made to represent the starting locations of both the ownship UAS and
manned intruder. The effect of generating UAS trajectories based on straight-in approaches can
be seen in Figure 3.4, where the starting point of the UAS is commonly in line with the airport
approach. Below, the terminal area where this data set was generated can be seen.

Figure 3.2

Airport used in the Generation of Terminal Data Set Encounters. Satellite Image of
the Airfield (left) and SkyVector Sectional (right)

Laurence G Hanscom Field, FAA airport designation KBED, has two runways. One
runway allows aircraft to takeoff and land from either 290 degrees heading with respect to north,
or 110 degrees heading depending on the active direction. The other runway allows for 230
degrees and 50 degrees. These directions explain why the UAS trajectories are heavily skewed to
those directions with respect to the airport and why there is inconsistency in the density of the
UAS starting points in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.3

Scatter Plot of Intruder Aircraft Starting Positions

The consistency of the intruder starting point density across the terminal airspace with a
roughly five-mile radius can be seen in Figure 3.3. This consistency differs from the UAS
ownship starting positions because of the difference in how MIT LL generated these trajectories.
Since, the UAS was intent-driven in landing or taking off from the airport located within this
bubble of airspace, the starting positions naturally tend to align with the airport shown previously
in the satellite and sectional images.
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Figure 3.4

Starting position of UAS ownship in encounter set

Overall, the data set represents a statistically significant representation of what UAS
approaches to a Class D Terminal airspace may look like, and the data set pairs these trajectories
with manned aircraft meant to come within a reasonable range of the UAS ownship over the
length of the encounter.
3.1.2.2

Example File
An example intruder file taken from this terminal data set is shown below in Table 3.1.

An example ownship file taken from this data set is shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.1
time_s

Intruder Encounter File Data.

speed_ftpsrelhdg_radroll_rad pitch_rad accel_ftpssx_ft
y_ft
alt_ft
vx_ftps vy_ftps vz_ftps turnrate_radps
lat_deg lon_deg
0 216.9709 1.040896
0
0
0 -2433.78 -31620.8 2030.543 109.6673 187.215
0
0 42.46319 -71.4046
1 216.9709 1.031238 -0.16463
0
0 -2323.69 -31433.8 2030.543 111.0632 186.3903 -9.7E-05 -0.02186 42.46349 -71.4039
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Table 3.2
time_s

Ownship Encounter File Data.

speed_ftpsrelhdg_radroll_rad pitch_rad accel_ftpssx_ft
y_ft
alt_ft
vx_ftps vy_ftps vz_ftps turnrate_radps
lat_deg lon_deg
0 162.5273 -0.08458
0
0
0 -18873.8 1520.564 743.9129 161.9463 -13.7308
0
0 42.41814 -71.2818
1 162.5273 -0.08458
0 -0.00473
0 -18711.8 1506.834 743.303 161.9445 -13.7306 -0.75089
0 42.41858 -71.2818

The data available for either aircraft, from left to right with respect to the above tables, is
time in seconds, speed in feet per second, relative heading in radians, roll of the aircraft in
radians, pitch in radians, acceleration in feet per second per second. The positional information is
available in either normalized x-y-z coordinates in feet, or latitude and longitude in degrees. The
velocity x, y, and z components are also available in feet per second. Last, in the third from the
right column, the turn rate in radians per second is provided. All of this information about the
trajectories can be used to represent an encounter between a UAS ownship and manned aircraft
intruder in a terminal area. The latitude and longitude provided could potentially provide a
relative range from the airport since the airport location is known. These two files are the inputs
into the simulation described by this thesis.
3.1.3

Monte Carlo Methods
Physical experimentation inherently has limits including time and possibility. Not all

scenarios in a non-deterministic problem can physically be tested. Mathematicians developed
numerical solutions to make up for this limitation and produced several viable methods. One
type of these methods is the Monte Carlo method. The intent of using the Monte Carlo method is
to cover all possibilities of a non-deterministic problem within numerical simulations using the
probability distribution functions for each variable likely to add a degree of freedom to the
output. This method can input several variables with respective probabilities and output an
approximate solution for the problem.
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Figure 3.5

Monte Carlo Method passing three diverse probability distributions through a
model to output a solution with standard deviation and a reliability curve.
(Wittwer, 2004)

In this thesis, a simplistic approach to applying Monte Carlo methods to the fast-time
simulations mentioned in Figure 3.5 is implemented. Other than the trajectories, speeds, and
altitudes, the basic sensor model representing the radar array is made variable through applying a
normal distribution to the probabilities of detection and error when tracking an intruder. This
approach is made simply for demonstrating how others may utilize the large encounter set for
validating their systems and is not to be an accurate representation of hardware modelling within
simulation.
3.1.4

DAIDALUS
DAIDALUS takes a novel approach at providing the autopilot with safe maneuvers to

escape a potential loss of well clear. The algorithm generates multiple outputs including levels of
alerting guidance and trajectories, called bands, meant to provide safe maneuvering of the
ownship to avoid intruder aircraft. This thesis research will utilize the core concepts of
DAIDALUS’ kinematic approach to alerting guidance and maneuver suggestion, without fully
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interfacing the actual source code. In Figure 3.6, the core concept of the DAIDALUS algorithm
is displayed. The possible trajectories the ownship could take are represented by paths and
arrows. The region where the well-clear volume is predicted to be violated is shaded. The
maximum turn angles for either direction are represented by α and β. A more detailed overview
of NASA’s DAIDALUS algorithm is presented in (NASA).

Figure 3.6

NASA’s DAIDALUS algorithm visualizing possible safe trajectories in an
encounter with an intruder aircraft.

For this research, an initial and singular kinematic projection of an intruder’s future path
is utilized. Important to note is the effect of wind on the intruder aircraft is neglected. This means
the initial speed and heading are initial conditions to the simple kinematic equations below,
where 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , and 𝑧𝑖 are the initial positions in Cartesian coordinates, 𝑥𝑓 , 𝑦𝑓 , and 𝑧𝑓 are the final
positions, and 𝑣𝑥 , 𝑣𝑦 , and 𝑣𝑧 are the current measured velocities of both the ownship and
intruder. Time is represented by the variable 𝑡 and spans 35 seconds in one-second intervals.
𝑥𝑓 = 𝑣𝑥 𝑡 + 𝑥𝑖
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(3.1)

𝑦𝑓 = 𝑣𝑦 𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖
𝑧𝑓 = 𝑣𝑧 𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖

(3.2)
(3.3)

During the simulation, after the sensors have established a track for the intruder, the
closest point of approach is estimated using the future state information output from the above
kinematic equations. If the estimated future distance between the ownship and intruder is
expected to reach less than 2,000 ft, then a maneuver is calculated for the ownship. This
maneuver is calculated using the ownship’s current heading and assumes a constant rate of
change in heading. Similar to the DAIDALUS algorithm, the possible avoidance maneuvers span
from left to right in one-degree increments with respect to the current direction of the ownship’s
nose. When no avoidance maneuver is deemed safe, the simulation chooses a random avoidance
band to follow. Future work should include the interfacing of the NASA C++ source code for
DAIDALUS with MATLAB.
3.1.5

Encounter Set Metadata
Considering that any encounter set can be generated by anyone who runs MIT LL’s open-

source encounter generator, there must be a standard for metadata describing each encounter set.
Hypothetically, any DAA integrator could randomly generate one million encounters that do not
stress test their models and algorithms the same way that one of the encounter sets made
available by MIT LL does. Therefore, it would be important for regulators to consider that any
two million generated trajectories do fall within a limited mean and distribution but are not
identical to other sets. One way of determining the robustness of any single encounter set is to
identify important metadata that can provide insight into the volatility of the encounters that must
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be simulated against. This section discusses some possible metadata that could be used to aid
regulators in determining important qualities of an encounter set as well as to inform those
intending to use encounter set generators for DAA simulation.
3.1.5.1

Risk Ratios
The intent of simulating any DAA system and algorithm pair is to generate an evaluation

of the risk associated with a UAS flying in the NAS. Regulators have worked to establish
acceptable percentage risk in the form of RRs as discussed previously. More specifically, the
encounter set inherently has a percentage of encounters that result in a loss of adequate selfseparation. The RR for LoWC can be calculated for each encounter, and an overall encounter
set-wide RR for LoWC and NMAC can be established as the baseline performance metric for the
DAA simulation. If the overall RR of an encounter set is very small, then the encounter set can
be considered not viable for suitably testing the DAA system by simulation. However, near
losses of self-separation could be of particular interest when evaluating probabilities of detection
and false tracks.
For this research, the MIT LL’s first publicly available one million encounters trained by
a Terminal Airspace data set were used. The RRs were assessed for the entirety of the set using
the lowest value for absolute range between the intruder and ownship over the entire encounter.
To violate Well Clear, both the vertical offset and horizontal offset needed to less than the selfseparation threshold. If the intruder simply passed directly over the ownship but at a difference in
altitude exceeding the vertical threshold, then the encounter was said to not violate the selfseparation threshold. There are drawbacks to this approach that will not be within the scope of
this research. Generally, a DAA algorithm will make a forecasted trajectory for the intruder after
a track has been established. In many instances, that trajectory may predict a loss of self23

separation in the future, but the intruder may turn prematurely due to the preestablished Bayes
trajectory thus avoiding the ownship’s airspace. For this research, this type of scenario was
neglected for establishing the baseline RRs. Therefore, the RRs for the encounter set were as
shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3

Risk Ratios for Loss of Well Clear and Near Mid-Air Collision for Terminal
Airspace Encounter Set without Mitigation.
Risk Ratio Type
Loss of Well Clear
Near Mid-Air
Collision

3.1.5.2

Value
0.106
0.04

Closest Point of Approach
The Closest Point of Approach (CPA) is simply the minimum distance between two

aircraft within any encounter for the whole length of the encounter. This distance can be
calculated as the absolute range between the two aircraft, taking their x-y-z positions and
calculating range as simply as below. Generally, the CPA has a horizontal and vertical
component, but the below equation represents the closest absolute distance between aircraft
during an encounter.

𝑐𝑝𝑎 = √((𝑥𝑜𝑤𝑛 − 𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑡 )2 + (𝑦𝑜𝑤𝑛 − 𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑡 )2 + (𝑧𝑜𝑤𝑛 − 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑡 )2 )
(3.4)

For this terminal data set, the following histogram in Figure 3.7 represents the CPA for
all one million encounters between a UAS and manned aircraft in a simulated terminal airspace
unmitigated by any DAA sensor or avoidance maneuver.
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Figure 3.7

3.1.5.3

Closest Point of Approach for One Million Unmitigated Encounters between an
Unmanned Aircraft and a Manned Aircraft near Class D Terminal Airspace.

Horizontal and Vertical Miss Distances
Given the CPA is known from the previous section, then two important metrics may be

calculated. The Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD) and Vertical Miss Distance (VMD) are
representations of how close two aircraft get within the length of an encounter. Although a HMD
may reach less than the horizontal self-separation threshold, the intruder aircraft could still have
an adequate vertical offset resulting in a non-violation. Similarly, the difference in altitude
between aircraft may even reach zero, but not at a point within the encounter that is meaningful
for safety assessment. To accurately capture the closeness of aircraft within an encounter, both
the HMD and VMD must be calculated. These calculated distances are simply the horizontal
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distance and vertical distances at the point of closest approach. The HMD and VMD are plotted
in Figure 3.8 for the given MIT LL Terminal Class D encounter set.

Figure 3.8

3.2

Scatter plot of Horizontal Miss Distance in feet on the horizontal axis and Vertical
Miss Distance in feet on the vertical axis.

Simulation Framework
The following section details the process flow of the rudimentary kinematic simulation

for the terminal data set. MATLAB source code may be found in Appendix A at the end of this
document. Key to note is this simulation is not representative of a robust simulation solution for
validating DAA systems integrated with UAS as such a simulation would require models for
noise, ground clutter, false tracks, empirical data models, etc. This simulation simply serves to
demonstrate to future DAA integrators tools like the Terminal Class D airspace data set. Future
26

integrators must consider variables like system timing, airspace clutter, classification of tracks
and other important concepts to develop their own simulation framework worthy of validating an
aircraft operating BVLOS in the NAS.
In this section, the sensor model is introduced. This model represents a perfect detect and
track radar array spanning 270 degrees and a range of 4,000 feet. Next, the detection, prediction,
and avoidance methodologies are presented. Each of these methodologies have inherent
functions that calculate important parameters to be passed along to the next function within the
simulation. In Figure 3.9, the simulation flow diagram is visualized with a start oval in green and
an end oval in red. The processes that occur within the simulation are represented by light blue
rectangles with the function name inside. Any decisions or conditionals are represented by
yellow diamonds with the output yes or no pointing to the respective next step. This simulation
pipeline may be a building block for future simulations that may include more realistic sensor
models and aircraft dynamics. The topic of future improvement is discussed in the future
research section in the last chapter of this thesis.
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Figure 3.9

Detect-and-Avoid Simulation Flow Diagram.
28

3.2.2

Sensor Model
This simulation involves a simulated three panel radar array treated as a homogeneous

system, scanning every one second for a FOV of 270 degrees total. The radar array is centered
with respect to down the nose of the UAS, offering 135 degrees FOV on either side of the
aircraft. The remaining 90 degrees is not accounted for by any sensor or method meaning any
perfect overtake scenario would result in a loss of well clear every time it is simulated. The value
chosen for maximum range of detection and tracking is 4,000 feet. This value comes from being
twice the range of the WCV, giving the ownship 2,000 feet to determine and execute an evasive
maneuver to avoid losing self-separation and is also influenced by the available specifications
from both radar manufacturers described in Chapter 2. The sensor array’s accuracy and
probability of detection are based on simple statistical distributions. The probability of detection
is based on a function of range that yields a 10 percent probability of detecting an intruder once
that intruder is within the FOV and 4,000 feet of the ownship. The below equation was used as it
increases exponentially as the range between the two aircraft decrease.
𝑃(𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 𝑒 −0.0005756∗𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒

(3.4)

This exponential function for probability of detecting an intruder within the ownship’s
FOV is not based on any empirical data or conclusions from real data. An integrator would need
to conduct bench testing of their DAA sensors and then determine an appropriate model for
detection and accuracy. The below plot in Figure 3.10 shows the probability of detection curve.
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Figure 3.10

Plot of radar detection based on range. Range values are on the horizontal axis in
feet and detection probability between 0 and 100 percent are on the vertical axis.

Figure 3.10 visualizes the curve for probability of detection. At the well clear horizontal
boundary at 2,000 feet, the radar array has a 32 percent chance of detecting an intruder. A
uniform random distribution function, rand() within MATLAB, gets called and if the value
returned is less than or equal to the probability yielded by the above equation, then the detection
function returns a track with accuracy determined by the next step.
Radar performance should be captured as probable error in azimuth, elevation, and range
based on environmental conditions and radar cross sections of the target. In this rudimentary
simulation, radar performance was not considered to this level of detail, rather a function was
created to take two concepts into account. First, the accuracy of the detected track increases as
the range between the ownship and intruder decreases. Second, a counter variable is made to
capture how many times the sensor has detected that same track. In a robust simulation, statespace estimation filters like Kalman Filters can be used to generate probable next states of an
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aircraft based on sensor data in real-time. To represent this crudely, as that counter variable goes
up, the accuracy of the obtained track increases. This means encounters where the intruder is
well within the FOV of the ownship and is considered detectable by the previous probability of
detection methodology, then as the encounter progresses, the accuracy of the detected track will
increase so long as the intruder does not leave the FOV.
This sensor model is not representative of real hardware modelling and is not meant to be
followed for DAA integrators. Variations in system timing is not accounted for in this sensor
model but should be for those simulating DAA integration. The intent of including a very
rudimentary and ideal sensor model is to demonstrate the use case of encounter simulation for
validating a DAA system and should not be followed step-by-step. The sensor model and
associated detection and prediction methodologies are only to provide a more introspective look
into how the encounter sets can be simulated rather than simply flying the UAS blind to its
airspace and unresponsive to well clear violations.
3.2.3

Detection Methodology
The methodology for detection within this particular rudimentary encounter simulation is

as follows. After the state space of the ownship and intruder are updated every iteration, a
function is called to determine if the ownship is in the correct orientation to be able to see the
intruder based on the sensor model’s parameters of FOV and detectable range. Once that
function is called, if it returns a detect intruder track, then the prediction methodology is
followed. If no track is returned from the detection function, then the simulation advances an
iteration without further function calls.
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3.2.4

Prediction Methodology
Once the detection function is called and returns a track, then a few functions are called

upon to provide a kinematic prediction of the intruder track based on the current detected
component velocities, heading, and turn rates of the intruder track. The amount of look ahead
time for the prediction can be changed in the user inputs object. Higher look ahead times will
provide a constant curvature trajectory that may form a circle if the intruder track’s turn rate is
significant at time of detection. The future state of the ownship is similarly calculated to help
inform the avoidance function.
3.2.5

Avoidance Methodology
The avoidance function is only called upon if the prediction function determines a future

loss of well clear given a predicted ownship and intruder trajectory. There is no optimization
present in this rudimentary simulation as the chosen avoidance maneuver is taken from a list of
bands that are predicted to not lose self-separation, and if none of these exist, then a random
maneuver is chosen from the list. Future research may include incorporating the actual C++ code
for NASA’s DAIDALUS with this simulation to provide a better look at how that algorithm
chooses an optimal avoidance maneuver. Once an avoidance maneuver is passed along to the
next step in the simulation, the ownship will follow that maneuver and then that single encounter
simulation will end.
3.3

Simulation Results
The following section visualizes some of the results of the one million encounter set

simulation. The simulation ran three separate times on an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 3960x CPU
with Asus Prime TRX40-PRO AMD 3rd Gen Ryzen Threadripper Strx4 ATX Motherboard and
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Corsair Vengeance 256 GB (8x32) of physical RAM over the course of approximately one hour
for each run.
Based on the kinematic simulation described, there was an average of 84,351 losses of
well clear and 3,660 near mid-air collisions. Compared to the previously described unmitigated
or base RR values, this is a 2.16% reduction in losses of well clear and a 0.0034% decrease in
near mid-air collisions. Relative to the base values, that corresponds to a 20.4% decrease in
losses of well clear by mitigation and a 8.5% decrease in near mid-air collisions by mitigation.
These simulations assumed perfect sensor knowledge and only one maneuver after detecting a
future self-separation violation. These numbers would be further mitigated with a more robust
DAA algorithm and sensor, as well as multiple updates to the avoidance calculations. Table 3.4
shows the respective RRs for the one million encounters simulated.
Table 3.4

Mitigated Risk Ratios over one million encounters in Terminal Class D airspace.
Risk Ratio Type
Loss of Well Clear
Near Mid-Air
Collision

Value
0.0844
0.0366

Although RR values have been put in draft standards for DAA sensors and systems, there
has not been a set of universally recognized values. Each airspace authority tends to operate
differently, and the level of risk may be different across countries or even states. UAS integrators
of DAA technologies must look to standardizing bodies like American Society of Testing and
Materials (ASTM) and Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) for the release of
official standards that may be accepted by the FAA. These organizations work alongside industry
experts and regulators to compromise what will be the status quo for UAS integrators.
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3.3.2

Terminal Airspace Encounter Examples
The following section provides some example figures of pairs of ownship and intruder

trajectories that were used as inputs to the overall fast-time encounter simulation. Intruder tracks
are marked in red and ownship tracks are marked in yellow for this section only. The starting
point of both the ownship and intruder are marked with boxes and arrows pointing to the tracks’
first position. All four examples of two aircraft encountering one another are from MIT LL’s
Terminal Class D airspace data set available on their encounter model overview at
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

Figure 3.11

Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory
marked in yellow and intruder trajectory marked in red.
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Figure 3.12

Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory
marked in yellow and intruder trajectory marked in red.

Figure 3.13

Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace.
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Figure 3.14

3.3.3

Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace.

Detect, Predict, and Avoid Examples
The following figures show a few examples of the sensor detecting an intruder and

calculating ownship and intruder projected trajectories. For the length of this section, the blue
lines are ownship trajectories, the red lines are intruder trajectories, the cyan dashed lines are
predicted arcs of future intruder tracks, and the light-yellow dashed lines are predicted ownship
trajectories. Red scattered circles along the intruder’s trajectory are visualizations of the DAA
sensor detecting an aircraft in its FOV and range limits.
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Figure 3.15

Two aircraft trajectories over Terminal Class D airspace. Ownship trajectory
marked in blue and intruder trajectory marked in red. In this case, the intruder
came within the FOV of the sensor and predictions for both intruder, cyan dashes,
and ownship, yellow dashes, were generated.

An example of an encounter with the sensor at perfect performance can be seen in Figure
3.15. The unmanned aircraft’s trajectory is marked in blue, and the manned aircraft is in red. The
red circles along the intruder’s path represent when the intruder was detected by the DAA sensor
without error, and the subsequent circles are the location of the intruder that is input into the
kinematic prediction that is called every iteration and is in the cyan hyphenated curved lines. In
contrast, Figure 3.16 below shows an encounter with the sensor error in detection being added to
the simulation. The variation in distance between the red circles is due to the lower probability of
detection and higher probability of error in the intruder’s true location as the intruder enters the
detectable range of the ownship’s sensors. As the encounter moves forward, the detections
become more consistent as the two aircraft get closer. The ownship’s predicted paths are marked
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by magenta hyphenated curves, and the intruder’s in cyan hyphenated curves. The consistent
cluster of red circles toward the end of the encounter are due to the range between aircraft
decreasing and the number of previous detections of the intruder aircraft increasing.

Figure 3.16

Two aircraft trajectories in an intercepting encounter within terminal airspace.
Intruder path in red, and ownship path in blue. After each detection of the intruder,
the predicted path of the ownship, in magenta hyphenated curves, and the
predicted path of the intruder, in cyan hyphenated lines is shown.
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CHAPTER IV
DAA SYSTEM INTEGRATION
The following section describes the research done to integrate a three-panel radar array
with a Group 3 UAS. The overall system of systems is described along with each subsystem’s
role in the DAA function. The hardware integration including the radar panel array, mission
computer, and autopilot are described next. Last, the software integration encompasses the radar
control code in C++ including the additional masking function based upon altitude, the
functional inputs and outputs of the DAIDALUS DAA algorithm, and finally an overview of the
previously described functions visualized by a communications flow diagram.
4.1

System of Systems
An unmanned aircraft consists of multiple subsystems that contribute to the overall

operation of the vehicle. The pilot may be on-the-loop, meaning responsible for maintaining the
mission, in-the-loop, meaning an active contributor to the controls, or out-of-the-loop. The pilot
is still a subsystem included in the overall system of systems no matter their role, active or
passive. The autopilot is a key system onboard the aircraft. Outside of the pilot’s inputs, the
autopilot actively reads and writes to the necessary controls to operate the aircraft. Global
Positioning System (GPS) signal, Attitude Heading and Reference System (AHRS) outputs, and
other navigation devices all communicate with the autopilot. Each subsystem, redundant or not,
contributes to the overall success of the flight.
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Any DAA sensor integrated with the existing UAS framework must work with the other
subsystems to enable BVLOS capabilities. The DAA integrator must understand the downstream
effects the DAA sensor has on the other functions. The physical hardware that scans the airspace
for targets serves the detect function as described in subsection 3.1. In the following section, the
mission computer must provide both the autopilot and pilot with an alert to acknowledge the
presence of a target output by the detect function. Last, the mission computer and autopilot
coordinate to conduct a maneuver if required to maintain self-separation from an intruder in the
ownship’s airspace. The systems responsible for each of these subroutines are detailed in the
following subsections.
4.1.1

Detect Function
The time that a DAA sensor spends scanning its FOV directly contributes to the efficacy

of the detect function. If a sensor has a large FOV and low scanning rate, then the DAA system
integrator must account for the lack of frequent updates to the downstream alert and avoid
functions. For example, suppose a DAA system has a wide FOV with only a 1 Hz update rate.
For every scan, a head-on intruder may close the distance between itself and the ownship by
hundreds of feet. Therefore, downstream functions like the alert and avoid functions should be
wary of the uncertainty of the track information. On the contrary, if a DAA system has a high
update rate, then the DAA system integrator should be careful not to inundate the subsequent
functions with large amounts of track data that may slow the overall DAA function. In the
following sections, simple procedural techniques are briefly described to account for these
challenges.
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4.1.2

Alert Function
The alert function encompasses the necessary distribution of intruder track information,

predicted intruder flight path, and overall safety risk to the avoid function. The alert function is
solely responsible for quantifying or qualifying the potential risk an intruder poses to the
ownship by providing the enabling switches to the avoid function. Many DAA algorithms use a
scale of integers to describe the potential risk of an intruder’s predicted flight path. The NASA
DAIDALUS algorithm provides a scale of numbers that reflect this risk. For a UAS operator to
understand the DAA function’s outputs, an alert level may be transmitted to the autopilot and/or
GCS as part of the alert function.
The second output of the alert function must be some form of relative airspace awareness
to the operator. This may be in the form of an updated airspace picture in the form of a GUI that
gives the operator an easily understandable relative location of the intruder. By both providing
the subsequent avoid function with the necessary alert level, as well as visualizing the potential
threat, the alert function is key to the success of any BVLOS operation.
4.1.3

Avoid Function
Finally, once the airspace has been scanned for intruders by the detect function, and the

intruder’s potential risk has been communicated by the alert function, then the avoid function
may be called upon to deescalate any encounter. The avoid function may be broken down to
three simple tasks. First, the avoid function encapsulates the calculation of trajectories that can
avoid losing self-separation with an intruder. Second, the necessary inputs to the autopilot are
made via the avoid function to begin the avoidance maneuver.
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4.2

Hardware Integration
Integrators of DAA technology with existing UAS platforms face many challenges. For

UAS already struggling with meeting flight time requirements, the addition of power consuming
and heavy DAA sensor suites may make the use case futile. Generally, this setback would
eliminate airborne DAA sensors for those UAS not capable of bearing the extra burden.
However, for large UAS greater than 55 pounds maximum Gross Takeoff Weight (MGTOW),
there is generally room for multiple payloads including DAA technologies. In this research, the
large UAS worked on had a sufficient power budget and the total DAA sensor array installation
did not weigh enough in comparison to the MGTOW of the UAS to see these negative effects.
The following section describes the hardware and software integration of a three-panel
radar array onto the nose of a Group 3 UAS. A simple method was created to help clear noise
from ground clutter in the form of altitude masking. The DAA algorithm DAIDALUS was
integrated with the system of systems to provide the avoidance maneuver functionality to be
included in future research.
4.2.1

Radar Array
The hardware integration predominantly consisted of mounting a three-panel radar array

to the nose of the large UAS. The orientation of the radar array can be seen in Figure 4.1. The
left and right radars have a 75-degree angular offset from the middle one. It can be assumed that
each radar has 120-degree azimuth coverage, given that both models of flat panel radars
described in the DAA technology section of this document share this common specification. A
reasonable range of 4,000 feet was determined given the specifications supplied by both of these
radar manufacturers.
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Figure 4.1

Radar array total coverage with two regions, marked 2 and 4 respectively, covered
redundantly on either side of the nose.

Doing some simple angle calculations, the total azimuth coverage comes out to
approximately 270 degrees. This totals to 75% of the total possible azimuth coverage of 360
degrees. Since the radars are faced forward, the 90-degree blind spot behind the large UAS must
be covered by procedural mitigations or the addition of rearward facing DAA technologies, even
though overtake encounters are unlikely. For the intent of this research, the blind spot is not
accounted for as future integration will involve covering this area.
4.3

Software Integration
A three-radar array was installed and integrated with in-house software and proprietary

APIs. The software presented was flown in a flight test and produced promising results in the
areas of communication and overall information flow. The following section overviews the work
done to integrate a radar array with an existing Group 3 UAS platform’s autopilot and a DAA
algorithm.
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4.3.1

Software Overview
To help with explaining the integration work done, several diagrams are presented to

visualize the flow of communications between the existing and added systems on the Group 3
UAS. The radar control software will not be detailed in this document due to the potential
leaking of proprietary information.In Figure 4.2, the flow between onboard autopilot, radar array
communications, the DAA algorithm, and finally the Graphical User Interface (GUI) is
visualized. In this architecture the autopilot provides telemetry and timing information to the
radar array communications and DAA algorithm C++ software. This information includes GPS
latitude, longitude and altitude as this information is used by both pieces of software. Down the
line, the radar array provides a look at the airspace to the GUI and the DAA algorithm provides
suggested alert levels and avoidance maneuvers in a visual manner to the pilot. Pilot-in-the-loop
software testing of this GUI has not been performed to evaluate effects like clutter and loading of
extra work on the pilot, but these tests should be considered by future integrators.

Figure 4.2

Overview of DAA software integration with an autopilot.
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Figure 4.3

4.3.2

Software architecture overview for DAA sensor array.

Radar Control
A C++ Application Programming Interface (API) was provided by the radar

manufacturer in order to facilitate the integration of the radar array with the existing systems on
the UAS. This API was integrated with the DAIDALUS algorithm and some autopilot
communications and control algorithms to create a control software. The details of this software
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and how it functions are not within the scope of this thesis, however a high-level process flow is
provided in Figure 4.3.
4.3.2.1

Altitude Masking
Even ground-based radar arrays can be bogged down by false tracks due to ground

clutter. Airborne radar arrays experience this misinformation on a generally larger scale due to
the vibration and movement of the platform that the sensors are mounted to. To help combat the
effect of trees, low flying birds, large vehicles passing, and other sources of ground clutter, an
altitude masking algorithm was added to the software integration. This algorithm simply took a
feedback loop approach to modifying where the radars needed to gather track data. The above
ground level altitude of the ownship was an input to the altitude mask command, and an
additional buffer of 50 feet was added to it. This masking technique helped to eliminate some of
the ground clutter, but still sources of clutter due to weather and higher-flying aviaries needs to
be added to the software integration. These methods are a possible source of future work for this
DAA integration onto a Group 3 UAS for BVLOS.
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CHAPTER V
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION
5.1

Future DAA Technology
As the current landscape of commercially available DAA sensor technologies advances,

the survey of DAA sensors within this document will become less encompassing. Future updates
to the list and specifications of the technologies explored will need to be made to capture the
growing pool of industry stakeholders that may be developing DAA sensors currently. This
research may be used as a starting point for future surveys into this sector of unmanned aviation
technology and may never be truly representative of every commercially available and private
product.
5.2

Simulation Gaps
The simulation presented here is predominantly focused on being a tool for exposing the

availability of various public databases of aircraft trajectories. This thesis does not contain
empirical DAA sensor performance data even though the radar array spoken of was physically
integrated, flight tested, and performance data were acquired. UAS integrators must collect
empirical sensor and platform performance data to model and put into their fast-time simulation
environments. One possible method would be to flight test several encounter geometries and
collect radar performance data based on Radar Cross Section (RCS) range, azimuth, and
elevation for radar-type sensors. Once the integrator collected adequate data, that performance
model could be an input to the fast-time simulations to provide a more robust understanding of
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the impact DAA sensor performance has on the unmanned system’s ability to maintain well clear
through variances based on a model including mean performance and standard deviation values.
5.3

Conclusion
The research done as part of this thesis covers the simulation, integration, and field

testing of a three-radar array installation onboard a Group 3 UAS platform1. The technology
survey presented will only increase with the positive forward momentum from regulating bodies,
allowing more industry players to soundly invest in this market. A kinematic simulation based on
very simplified kinematics has been presented as a reference for future integrators. The
simulation determined that the addition of a 270-degree sensor with a probability of detection set
to 10 percent at 4,000 feet and increasing exponentially with the decrease in range to have a
positive effect on the ability of a UAS to detect and promptly avoid intruding aircraft in the
described terminal airspace dataset . An overview of the hardware and software installation is
also detailed. As this research moves forward, additional technical and procedural mitigations
will be emplaced both in practice and in simulation to further the comprehensive safety case for
flying an unmanned Group 3 platform beyond the visual capabilities of the operator. This thesis
research serves as one of many steppingstones toward that fruitful goal for the unmanned sector
of aviation, and given the future research suggested here, there will be plenty of work to be done.

1

The three-radar array DAA sensor suite was flight tested and promising results for the future of this research were
acquired as part of the research that surrounds this thesis.
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APPENDIX A
MATLAB SIMULATION SOURCE CODE
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DAA_Simulation_v02.m
Author: Kyle Ryker
Last Updated Date: 9 June 2021
Overview: The following is a very simple kinematic simulation script that works with several
function and class files. The user can input several simulation parameters that may change the
output of the simulation. The overall purpose of the simulation script is to provide a very simple
way to evaluate a DAA Sensor against the Terminal Airspace data set provided by
Massachusetts’s Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory here:
https://github.com/Airspace-Encounter-Models/em-overview#terminal-encounter-model

Simulation Inputs

Initialization of an object of class UserInputs() for ease of use later

Simulation Outputs
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A.1

Main

A for-loop is used here because there are 1,000 '.mat' files named 'EncounterFilexxx.mat' where
xxx is a number from 1 to 1,000. Each encounter file contains 1,000 sets of two trajectories for
simulation, therefore a total of 1,000,000 overall. This outer for-loop is to go through each '.mat'
file and the inner for-loop is to iterate through each of the 1,000 encounters within it.
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55

56

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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A.2

User Inputs Class

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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A.3

predictKinTrack function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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A.4

loadEncounterFile Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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A.5

dtmLoWC Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a

61

A.6

checkProbDetection Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
A.7

checkSensor_v02 Function
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Published with MATLAB® R2020a
A.8

addSensorError Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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A.9

checkBands Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
64

A.10

calcRelHdg Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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A.11

calcKinBands Function

Published with MATLAB® R2020a
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APPENDIX B
OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS FOR UAS INTEGRATORS
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B.1

MIT Lincoln Laboratory Datasets
Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratory has been developing several

datasets over the past decade. A few of these datasets capture air traffic over the continental
United States (CONUS). The first set is the Traffic Density Database (Edwards). The air traffic
data captured covers hundreds of thousands of flight hours at all altitudes able to be seen by a
long-range radar network across the CONUS. Work done to filter and extract aircraft models
from the CONUS radar data can be read in (M.J. Kochenderfer). In Figure B.1, the total
coverage by the radar network is displayed.

Figure B.1

Total radar coverage of the Continental United States included within the Traffic
Density Database.

The database can be accessed via the MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s MATLAB software
available on their GitHub. The data can be filtered by altitude to give UAS integrators relevant
encounter probability information for their potential operations.
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The other available database by MIT Lincoln Laboratory is the ADS-B OpenSky
Network (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Since the radar-based network previously
discussed could not capture low altitudes away from terminal airspace, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
reached out to the community to crowdsource an ADS-B receiver network. Example ADS-B
tracks for a fixed-wing manned aircraft is shown below.

Figure B.2

Track segments for a fixed-wing multi-engine FAA (USA) registered aircraft in
the NAS taken from MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s OpenSky Network GitHub.

UAS Integrators may use these available databases to create comprehensive safety cases
specific to the airspace they wish to fly in. Encounter probability can be estimated for various
altitudes and with the OpenSky Network, these estimates can be applicable to lower altitudes not
covered by the radar network.
B.2

MIT Lincoln Laboratory Bayesian Network Models
Part of the work done by MIT Lincoln Laboratory was to create models of how pilots and

aircraft behave based on variables such as airspace, altitude, and aircraft type. To do so, MIT
Lincoln Laboratory used a Bayesian network approach to determining a sufficient and
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statistically representative model for their behavior. These statistical networks can generate
millions of trajectories that are based on real world flight data. A table of the various types of
models of aircraft and unconventional air vehicles available for track generation is listed below.
More information on the models can be found on their GitHub post titled em-model-mannedbayes.
Table B.1
Model

Types of aircraft models, both conventional and unconventional, provided by MIT
Lincoln Laboratory’s GitHub.
Description (Version)

Altitude Scope

correlated

Aircraft squawking a Mode 3A/C discrete code over the
CONUS (v1.1)

[1000, Inf]

correlated

Aircraft squawking a Mode 3A/C discrete code (v2.1)

[1000, Inf]

uncorrelated Aircraft squawking Mode 3A/C of 1200 over the CONUS
(v1.0)
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders
uncorrelated Aircraft squawking Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v2.x)
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders

[500, 18000]

correlated

[500, 18000]

Aircraft squawking Mode 3A/C of 1200 over littoral
regions (v1.0)

[500, 18000]

uncorrelated Aircraft squawking a Mode 3A/C discrete code over
littoral regions (v1.0)

[1000, 45000]

uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-engine with ADS-B Out not squawking
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2)

[50, 5000]

uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-engine with ADS-B Out squawking
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2)
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders
uncorrelated Fixed wing single-engine with ADS-B Out not squawking
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2)

[50, 5000]

uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-single with ADS-B Out squawking
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2)
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders

[50, 5000]
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[50, 5000]

Table B.1 (continued)
Model

Description (Version)

Altitude Scope

uncorrelated Fixed wing multi-engine with ADS-B Out not squawking
Mode 3A/C of 1200 (v1.2)

[50, 5000]

uncorrelated Rotorcraft with ADS-B Out squawking Mode 3A/C of
1200 (v1.2)
Surrogate for conventional aircraft without transponders
uncorrelated Rotorcraft with ADS-B Out (v1.0)

[50, 5000]

uncorrelated Fixed wing single-engine with ADS-B Out (v1.0)

[50, 5000]

uncorrelated Rotorcraft with ADS-B Out (v1.0)

[50, 5000]

uncorrelated Hot air balloons (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Airships (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Flexible wing hang gliders (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Rigid wing hang gliders (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Gliders (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Paragliders (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Paramotors (v1.0)

[0, 10000]

uncorrelated Skydivers (v1.0)

[0, 15000]

uncorrelated Weather balloons (v1.0)

[0, 120000]
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[50, 5000]

Table B.1 (continued)
Model

Description (Version)

Altitude Scope

due regard

Aircraft participating in the ETMS (v1.0)

(0, Inf]

HAA

Rotorcraft of a Massachusetts-based HAA operator

(0, 5000]

B.3

MIT Lincoln Laboratory Simulation Tools
Last, MIT Lincoln Laboratory has developed several tools for simulating DAA systems.

One of which is the DAA Evaluation of Guidance, Alerting, and Surveillance (DEGAS)
simulator. This simulation framework uses MATLAB and Simulink to iterate through a Monte
Carlo simulation of any DAA system. DEGAS is currently interfaceable with NASA’s
DAIDALUS algorithm. More information about the simulation and the downloadable source
code can be found on their GitHub page at https://github.com/mit-ll/degas-core. UAS integrators
may use this simulation as a reference for designing DAA sensor simulations.
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